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Abstract 
 
 
This paper develops a model of cross-Strait relations in 
terms of a series of four paradoxes.  The first is that China’s 
aggressiveness in initiating the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-96 
set off a series of contretemps between the two sides of the 
Strait that almost certainly made the achievement of Beijing’s 
objectives considerably harder.  Second, the polarization in 
Taiwan over national identity and cross-Strait relations that 
erupted after the turn of the century was at least somewhat 
surprising, both because the partisan cleavage on these issues 
had noticeably de-escalated during the 1990s and because public 
opinion on them has always been decidedly unpolarized.  Third, 
despite strident DPP criticism that Ma Ying-jeou, the current 
KMT President, has threatened Taiwan by increasing its economic 
dependency upon the PRC, the huge surge in Taiwan’s trade and 
investment with China this century actually occurred during the 
administration of his DPP predecessor, Chen Shui-bian.  Fourth, 
the rapprochement between Taiwan and China after Ma’s election 
in 2008 is at least somewhat paradoxical because it may not 
presage long-term stability in cross-Strait relations.  Ma’s 
reluctance to enter into political negotiations with the PRC 
indicates that he agrees with the DPP to some extent about the 
danger of falling into China’s clutches (even if this belies 
their charges about his motivations); and the PRC’s refusal to 
make any concessions about Taiwan’s sovereignty suggests that 
future conflict might be likely.  
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Taiwan’s policies toward cross-Strait relations over the 
last two decades certainly constitute a “two-level game” in 
which domestic and foreign policy are intertwined1 because 
relations with China are one of the central issues in domestic 
politics that divide the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and 
the Kuomintang (KMT).On the international level, China and 
Taiwan contend, sometimes sharply and sometimes more implicitly, 
over the sovereignty of Taiwan.  On the domestic level, the DPP 
and the KMT contend almost always sharply over whether the 
former’s policies “stand up for Taiwan” or needlessly provoke 
Beijing and whether the latter’s bring stability to cross-Strait 
relations or threaten Taiwan’s sovereignty and dignity.2
A little thought, furthermore, suggests that many aspects 
of this two-level game appear to be surprisingly paradoxical.  
This paper, hence, develops a model of cross-Strait relations in 
terms of a series of four such paradoxes.  The first is that 
 
                                                 
1Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomatic and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games,” International Organization Vol. 42 (Summer 1988) pp. 427-460.   
 
2Cal Clark, “The U.S. Balancing Role in Cross-Strait Relations: The Irony of 
‘Muddling Through,’” Issues & Studies Vol. 42 (September 2006) pp. 129-163; 
Yu-Shan Wu, “Strategic Triangle, Change of Guard, and Ma’s New Course,” pp. 
30-61 in Cal Clark, Ed., The Changing Dynamics of Relations Among China, 
Taiwan, and the United States (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2011).   
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China’s aggressiveness in initiating the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 
1995-96 set off a series of contretemps between the two sides of 
the Strait that almost certainly made the achievement of 
Beijing’s objectives considerably harder.  Second, the 
polarization in Taiwan over national identity and cross-Strait 
relations that erupted after the turn of the century was at 
least somewhat surprising, both because the partisan cleavage on 
these issues had noticeably de-escalated during the 1990s and 
because public opinion on themhas always been decidedly 
unpolarized.  Third, despite strident DPP criticism that Ma 
Ying-jeou, the current KMT President, has threatened Taiwan by 
increasing its economic dependency upon the PRC, the huge surge 
in Taiwan’s trade and investment with China this century 
actually occurred during the administration of his DPP 
predecessor, Chen Shui-bian.  Fourth, the rapprochement between 
Taiwan and China after Ma’s election in 2008 is at least 
somewhat paradoxical because it may not presage long-term 
stability in cross-Strait relations.  Ma’s reluctance to enter 
into political negotiations with the PRC indicates that he 
agrees with the DPP to some extent about the danger of falling 
into China’s clutches (even if this belies their charges about 
his motivations); and the PRC’s refusal to make any concessions 
about Taiwan’s sovereignty suggests that future conflict might 
be likely. 
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Paradox 1: 
China’s Aggressiveness Appears Counterproductive  
 
For most of the postwar era, relations between the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China on Taiwan 
(ROC) have been fairly conflictual, which is quite 
understandable given their mutually contradictory claims to 
exercise sovereignty over Taiwan.  Yet from the mid-1980s to the 
mid-1990s, relations between Beijing and Taipei were fairly 
amicable as both seemed willing to accept the other, at least 
tacitly.  Taiwan did not challenge the PRC claim of de jure 
sovereignty over the area controlled by the ROC, while China did 
not challenge the ROC’s de facto exercise of sovereignty in it.  
The sudden eruption of the 1995-96 Crisis in the Taiwan Strait 
changed this dynamic greatly, setting off a series of disputes 
and confrontations that lasted until a KMT president committed 
to improving relations with the PRC was elected in 2008.3
Theseemingly stable situation in the Taiwan Strait area in 
the late 1980s ultimatelybroke down because of clashing 
perceptions between the ROC and the PRC.  Both countries had 
fairly optimistic perspectives about their futures in the early 
 
                                                 
3 This historical sequence is modeled in Cal Clark, “The Taiwan Relations Act 
and the U.S. Balancing Role in Cross-Strait Relations,” American Journal of 
Chinese Studies Vol. 17 (April 2010) pp. 3-18. 
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1990svis-a-viseach other because they evidently believed that 
time was on their side in the sense that existing political and 
economic trends were working in their favor.  Beijing thought 
that growing economic and social ties across the Strait would 
gradually undercut Taiwan’s separation from the Mainland, while 
Taipei saw its separate international status being gradually 
established and consolidated through President Lee Teng-hui’s 
“pragmatic diplomacy.”4
By 1995, however, both began to fear that the other’s 
positive assessments were coming true.  Taiwan became 
increasingly worried that China was successfully isolating it 
diplomatically and making the island economically dependent on 
the Mainland, while China worried that Taiwan was on the verge 
of establishing Taiwan Independence.  Cross-Strait relations 
then erupted in the summer of 1995 following a trip by President 
Lee Teng-hui to his alma mater, Cornell University, that he had 
pressured the United States to allow him to make.  While this 
seemed to be simply an extension of Taiwan’s existing “pragmatic 
diplomacy,” China reacted unexpectedly and extremely strongly to 
Lee’s visit, arguing that this represented a major change in 
American policy supporting Lee’s alleged effort to turn 
 
                                                 
4Murray A. Rubinstein, “Political Taiwanization and Pragmatic Diplomacy in the 
Eras of Chiang Ching-Kuo and Lee Teng-hui, 1971-1994,” pp. 436-480 in Murray 
A. Rubinstein, Ed., Taiwan: A NewHistory (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999). 
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“creeping officiality” into Taiwan Independence.  Indeed, China 
went ballistic (almost literally) during 1995-96 with a series 
of war games and missile tests close to Taiwan that were clearly 
aimed at intimidating voters in the December legislative and 
March presidential elections.  The United States responded with 
very clear military deterrence aimed at the PRC by, for example, 
sending aircraft carrier groups through the Taiwan Strait.5
The confrontation quickly de-escalated after Lee handily 
won re-election, but as shown in Figure 1 this set off a series 
of crises that erupted, on average, every two years, with 
Beijing and Taipei alternating in the initiation of the 
confrontation.  For example, Lee Teng-hui enraged China and 
flustered the United States in 1999 by proclaiming that Taipei 
and Beijing were linked by “special state-to-state relations;” 
and China retaliated by attempting to intimidateTaiwanese voters 
in the 2000 presidential election and by ignoring the 
conciliatory policies of the new President Chen Shui-bian of the 
Democratic Progressive Party after the election.  President 
Chen, for his part, set off another round of hostility when he 
proclaimed that there is “one country on each side of the Taiwan 
Strait” in July 2002.  Subsequently, Chen’s appeals to Taiwanese 
nationalism alternated with Chinese reactions such as its 2005 
 
                                                 
5Suisheng Zhao, Ed., Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 
1995-1996 Crisis (New York: Routledge, 1999). 
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Anti-Secession Law; and Chen retaliated with a series of 
nationalistic policy changes in early 2006.6
Figure 1 about here 
 
Jiang Zemin, China’s leader in 1995, was under pressure 
from the military, hardliners in the political leadership, and a 
growing popular nationalism to “get tough” with Taiwan.  
Initially, at least, China claimed to be quite happy with the 
outcome and with stopping a perceived movement toward Taiwan 
Independence.  A longer-term perspective makes this conclusion 
quite questionable, however.  In the tit-for-tat sequence 
outlined in Figure 1, Taiwan’s leaders regularly took far 
stronger stances in support of Taiwanese sovereignty after the 
1995-96 Crisis; and the suspicion of the PRC that grew 
cumulatively among Taiwanese has made political concessions by 
the ROC increasingly more difficult.  Thus, paradoxically, the 
PRC’s greater aggressiveness, if anything, has undermined its 
ability to pursue Unification with Taiwan.  
  
                                                 
6 Richard C. Bush, At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 1942 
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004); Edward Friedman, Ed., China’s Rise, Taiwan’s 
Dilemmas and International Peace (New York: Routledge, 2005); Jing Huang with 
Xiaoting Li, Inseparable Separation: The Making of China’s Taiwan Policy 
(Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2010); Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait 
Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis Within China(Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2009). 
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Paradox 2: 
Polarization Despite Seemingly Mitigating Factors 
 
Chen Shui-bian’s election as President was followed by a 
growing bitter polarization between the DPP and KMT on the 
interlinked issues of national identity and cross-Strait 
relations.  Two distinct types of issues were involved in this 
polarization.  The first was an ongoing struggle over the 
“localization” or Bentuhua of the country’s politics and 
especially culture which was consistently pushed by the Chen 
administration.  The second involved cross-Strait relations with 
the People’s Republic of China and was more episodic; and here 
Chen Shui-bian’s policies were far from consistent over time.  
Domestically, Chen displayed a strong commitment to 
pursuing Bentuhua to create a “Taiwan-centric paradigm” for the 
nation.7
                                                 
7John Makehamand A-chin Hsiau, Eds.,Cultural, Ethnic, and Political 
Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan: Bentuhua. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005). 
  This, in turn, stimulated substantial opposition and 
pushback from the old guard KMT.  Wei-chin Lee, for example, 
argues that Chen promoted a Cultural Reconstruction Movement 
that included such initiatives as changing the name of many 
agencies and organizations to stress “Taiwan,” promoting 
Islander dialects in language policy, revising the official 
policy toward the mass media to reverse the previous KMT 
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domination of outlets (including the encouragement of 
underground radio stations), and changing the focus from Chinese 
to Taiwanese history in education policy.8  Thus, Daniel Lynch 
concluded that Chen and his “Green” bloc (named for the primary 
color of the DPP flag) were trying to create a new nation rooted 
in Taiwanese history and culture.9
Relations with China were much more volatile, despite Chen 
Shui-bian’s image as a zealot in promoting the declaration of de 
jure Taiwan Independence.  Chen’s pushing the envelope on the 
Independence issue commenced in the summer of 2002 when he 
proclaimed the theory that “one country on each side of the 
Taiwan Strait” existed, provoking significant unhappiness in 
both Beijing and Washington.  After that, he periodically set 
off contretemps with Beijing and Washington until he left office 
in 2008, as he challenged China’s “red lines” on Taiwan 
Independence by, for example, proposing or holding referenda on 
issues that might affect Taiwan’s international status and by 
advocating fundamental change to the country’s Constitution.  
Yet, there were also signs of pragmatism in Chen’s policies 
toward cross-Strait relations.  He was fairly conciliatory 
 
                                                 
8Wei-chin Lee, “Taiwan’s Cultural Reconstruction Movement: Identity Politics 
and Collective Action since 2000,” Issues & StudiesVol. 41 (January 2005) pp. 
1-51. 
 
9Daniel C. Lynch,“Taiwan’s Self-Conscious Nation-Building Project,” Asian 
SurveyVol. 44 (July/August 2004) pp. 513-533. 
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toward an unresponsive PRC for his first two years in office and 
negotiated a “Ten Point Consensus” with the widely perceived 
pro-China James Soong in early 2005.  More broadly, he followed 
a pattern of being aggressive toward China during electoral 
campaigns to appeal to the “deep Green” Taiwanese nationalists 
and then sounding much more conciliatory after the election was 
over.  Indeed, he only became stridently pro-Independence 
consistently in 2006 when burgeoning scandals deprived him of 
support from almost everybody except the deep Greens.10
For their part, the KMT and its “Blue” coalition (named for 
one of the colors in the KMT flag) returned to a much more 
“China-centric” stance after Lee Teng-hui left the party 
following its defeat in the 2000 presidential election.  
According to the model developed by Yu-shan Wu, this represented 
a direct response to their electoral situation.  During 
elections, Wu argues that the KMT acts like a catch-all party 
and appeals to moderate voters with centrist policies.  Between 
elections when the party is out of power (as it was from 2000 to 
2008), in contrast, it focuses its appeals on keeping the 
support of the pro-China “deep Blues,” while acting in a more 
pragmatic or “realist” manner when it controls the government.
 
11
                                                 
10 Cal Clark and Alexander C. Tan,Taiwan’s Political Economy: Meeting 
Challenges, Pursuing Progress(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2011) Chapter 6. 
 
 
11Wu, “Strategic Triangle, Change of Guard, and Ma’s New Course.” 
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By the middle of the first decade in the 21st century, 
therefore, a harsh and viciously divisive debate over cross-
Strait relations and national identity had come to dominate 
Taiwan’s politics.  The Greens argued that they must “stand up 
for Taiwan” and accused the Blues of selling Taiwan out to 
China.  In stark contrast, the Blues contended that the Greens 
were needlessly provocative and that a more accommodating policy 
could defuse the threat from China.  Taken to the extreme (which 
they often were), these positions implied that one side was the 
savior and the other the destroyer of Taiwan and its statehood.  
Unfortunately, both critiques seem to have had some merit.  
President Chen’s periodic appeals to his pro-Independence “base 
constituency” for primarily domestic purposes both infuriated 
China and at times strained relations with the United States, 
thereby threatening to undermine Taiwan’s position in the 
Taipei-Beijing-Washington “triangle.”  Conversely, the Blue 
attempts to “do business” with Beijing undermined Chen’s ability 
to deal with China; and there were even fairly credible rumors 
that Blue leaders had urged both the PRC and US to “get tough” 
with the Chen administration which in itself might have created 
a security threat to Taiwan.12
                                                 
12 Clark and Tan, Taiwan’s Political Economy, Chapter 6; Dennis Van Vranken 
Hickey, “Complicating the Complicated: The Role of Societal Actors in 
Taiwan’s External Relations,” Paper presented at the Conference on Taiwan 
Issues, University of South Carolina, 2006; Shelley Rigger, “The Unfinished 
Business of Taiwan’s Democratization,” pp. 16-42 in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, 
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This polarization is now so prevalent that many, if not 
most, observers consider it “natural.”  Yet, it can be 
considered surprising or paradoxical for two distinct, though 
interlinked reasons.  First, although political science theory 
posits that the positions of political parties reflect the 
distribution of public opinion in democratic societies,13
                                                                                                                                                             
Ed., Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-China-Taiwan Crisis(New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2005).  
 this 
does not appear to be the case in Taiwan.  For the last two 
decades, for example, public opinion surveys have asked whether 
people identify themselves as Chinese, Taiwanese, or a 
combination of both.  Table 1 shows that national identity 
clearly possessed a normal distribution in 1992 as just over 
half the population (52%) expressed a dual identity, while 
Chinese identifiers slightly outnumbered Taiwanese ones (28% to 
20%).  This changed dramatically in just eight years.  In 2000, 
about half the population (47%) still had dual identification, 
but Taiwanese identifiers outnumbered Chinese ones 39% to 14%; 
and the trend toward greater Taiwanese identification continued 
apace in the new century.  By 2010, 55% of the population 
identified solely as Taiwanese versus a minuscule 3% Chinese 
identifies, with 42% dual identifies.  Interpreting these data 
 
13Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy(New York: HarperCollins, 
1957); Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). 
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is at least a little ambiguous.  On the one hand, the rapid 
growth to dominance of Taiwanese identifiers is consistent with 
growing polarization and the DPP’s ability to create a new 
Taiwanese nation.  On the other hand, the strong minority who 
continue to express a dual identification is inconsistent with 
the image of a new totally “Taiwanese” nation, as is the DPP’s 
poor performance at the polls in the 2008 legislative and 
presidential elections. 
Table 1 about here 
There is no ambiguity, however, in public opinion about 
cross-Strait relations.  This can also be seen in how the 
citizenry views the best option for Taiwan’s international 
status:  1) Taiwan Independence, 2) the current status quo of an 
uncertain sovereignty, or 3) Unification with the PRC.  Table 2 
demonstrates that over the last two decades marked majorities of 
about 60% have supported the diplomatic status quo, ambiguous 
and even ridiculous as it may be.  This distribution is not 
fully normal, though, because the two extremes are not balanced.  
In particular, between 1994 and 2010 the relative support for 
Independence and Unification flip-flopped from 14% - 25% to 24% 
- 12%.  Overall, though, popular opinion is certainly dominated 
by the moderate middle, perhaps because both the extreme 
positions are viewed as extremely dangerous.  
Table 2 about here 
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A second paradox is that the eruption of polarization over 
national identity at the beginning of the 21st century followed a 
de-escalation of conflict about the issue in the 1990s.  
Following the evacuation of the Chiang Kai-shek regime to Taiwan 
in 1949 at the end of the Chinese Civil War, the island has 
suffered from a clear ethnic cleavage between the Mainlanders 
who came with Chiang (a little under 15% of the population) and 
the long-time residents of Taiwan or Islanders who also were 
almost all ethnically Han Chinese.  The Mainlanders dominated 
the government and imposed a harsh and repressive rule termed 
the “White Terror” until the country’s democratic transition in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s.14
Consequently, it was widely expected that Taiwan’s 
democratic transition in the late 1980s and early 1990s would 
unleash previously repressed ethnic tensions and frustration.  
Political forces soon began to push both parties away from these 
stark alternatives, as sketched in Figure 2.  In the KMT, 
Islander Lee Teng-hui, who as Vice-President succeeded Chiang 
Kai-shek’s son Chiang Ching-kuo as President after his death in 
1988, responded to this opportunity with what appeared to be 
inspired statesmanship on the national identity question.  As 
Lee consolidated his power, he managed to straddle the national 
 
                                                 
14 Makeham and Hsiau, Bentuhua; Douglas Mendel, The Politics of Formosan 
Nationalism(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970). 
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identity issue quite astutely, implicitly portraying himself as 
a moderate between the pro-Independence DPP and the pro-
Unification members of the KMT and (after 1993) the New Party 
who tended to be Mainlanders.  While retaining a commitment to 
Unification with China in the indefinite future, he aggressively 
began to pursue the “pragmatic diplomacy” of trying to upgrade 
Taiwan’s international status.  Furthermore, the victory of 
Lee’s “Mainstream” faction clearly promoted the “Taiwanization” 
of the party -- which made it hard to blame it for the 
repression of the “old” KMT.15
Figure 2 about here 
 
For its part, the DPP began to moderate its position on 
Taiwan Independence in the early 1990s after the inclusion of a 
pro-Independence plank in the party charter cost it 
significantly at the polls in1991.  In particular, the Chinese 
military threats during the 1996 presidential elections and the 
woeful showing of the pro-Independence DPP candidate evidently 
convinced most of its leaders that Taiwan Independence was 
simply unfeasible.  Consequently, the DPP began to downplay 
Independence without ever formally renouncing it.  For example, 
some (but far from all) DPP leaders began to argue that Taiwan 
                                                 
15 LindaChao and Ramon H. Myers, The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life 
in the Republic of China (Baltimore: John’s Hopkins University Press, 1998); 
Steven J. Hood, The Kuomintang and the Democratization of Taiwan(Boulder, CO: 
Westview, 1997).  
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already was an independent country, so there was no need for a 
formal declaration of Independence.16
Taiwan’s political dynamics in the late 1990s, therefore, 
suggested that partisan differences over national identity were 
narrowing and losing their intensity.  The result on the right 
side of Figure was a series of events that would have been 
considered quite remarkable just a few years earlier.  First, in 
terms of national identity, Lee Teng-hui’s concept of a “New 
Taiwanese” identity that was open to both Islanders and 
Mainlanders proved to be very popular.  Second, the National 
Development Conference of 1996 produced a consensus among the 
DPP, KMT, and New Party on the previously highly contentious 
issue of cross-Strait relations.  Finally, this growing 
moderation on national identity and cross-Strait relations 
carried over into the extremely competitive presidential 
campaign of 2000.  Although the three major candidates certainly 
criticized each other (and especially caricatures of each 
other), they all really advocated the moderate position of 
  Similarly, the threat from 
China made advocating Unification politically untenable for the 
New Party and old guard KMT.   
                                                 
16 Shelley Rigger, From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive 
Party (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001); T.Y. Wang, “One China, One Taiwan: An 
Analysis of the Democratic Progressive Party’s China Policy,” pp. 159-182 in 
Wei-chin Lee, Ed., Taiwan in Perspective(Leiden: Brill, 2000). 
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toning down hostilities with Beijing, while strongly protecting 
Taiwan’s sovereignty.17
 
 
Paradox 3: 
Trade Statistics and the DPP’s Charge that 
Ma is Selling Out Taiwan 
 
By the end of his second term, President Chen Shui-bian had 
become highly unpopular for a combination of reasons:  fears 
that he had unduly provoked the PRC, growing economic problems 
in Taiwan, and burgeoning political scandals.  Thus, it was not 
surprising that the KMT candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, won the 2008 
presidential election easily with 58% of the vote.  Ma proposed 
a rapprochement with China and, in particular, argued that 
expanding economic relations with the PRC was vital for Taiwan’s 
economic recovery.  To allay fears that he might be perceived as 
“selling out” Taiwan, he also advocated a set of “Three Nos” 
that pledged commitment to the status quo in cross-Strait 
relations:  No Unification, No Independence, and No use of 
force.18
                                                 
17Clark and Tan, Taiwan’s Political Economy, Chapter 3; Dafydd Fell, Party 
Politics in Taiwan: Party Change and the Democratic Evolution of Taiwan, 
1991-2004 (London: Routledge, 2005). 
 
 
18John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 2008 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election: 
Maturing Democracy (Baltimore: University of Maryland Series in Contemporary 
Asian Studies, 2008). 
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Still, Ma’s Mainlander status made many Greens quite 
suspicious of his intentions.  Thus, his promotion of cross-
Strait economic ties, in particular the agreement on the “Three 
Direct Links” in November 2008 and the much broader free trade 
agreement or Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in 
June 2010, prompted massive popular demonstrations and, in the 
case of ECFA, a major brawl in the Legislative Yuan.19Critics 
felt that Ma was putting Taiwan’s sovereignty and dignity at 
risk by giving the PRC substantial economic leverage over it and 
was leading the country to economic decline because the growing 
economic integration with China was undercutting the viability 
of important Taiwanese industries and tended to benefit a fairly 
narrow business and professional elite.20
One would expect, therefore, that Ma’s economic deals with 
China would have set off a huge surge in trade and investment 
across the Taiwan Strait that would present a stark contrast to 
what happened under his predecessor, Chen Shui-bian, who “stood 
up” for Taiwan and had fairly frosty relations with Beijing.The 
 
                                                 
19Thomas B. Gold,“Taiwan in 2008: My Kingdom for a Horse,” Asian Survey Vol. 
49 (January-February 2009), pp. 88-97;Hung-Mao Tien and Chen-Yuan Tung, 
“Taiwan in 2010: Mapping for a New Political Landscape and Economic Outlook,” 
Asian SurveyVol. 51 (January-February 2011) pp. 76-84. 
 
20Thomas B. Gold,“Taiwan in 2009: Eroding Landslide,” Asian Survey Vol. 50 
(January-February 2010), pp.65-75; Chung-Hsin Hsu, “ECFA: The Emerging Crisis 
Facing Taiwan,” pp. 240-254 in Cal Clark, Ed., The Changing Dynamics of 
Relations Among China, Taiwan, and the United States (Newcastle upon Tyne, 
UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011).   
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data on trade and investment flows between Taiwan and China 
present a much different picture, however.  In general and quite 
surprisingly perhaps, they rapidly expanded during most of 
Chen’s administration and have remained fairly stable during the 
first three years of Ma’s presidency. 
A surge in economic interactions across the Strait 
commenced in the early 1990s due to the confluence of the 
political relaxation at that time between Taipei and Beijing 
noted in the first section and the complementary economic change 
that was occurring in the two countries (i.e., China was 
developing the very industries that were leaving Taiwan).  
Furthermore, the two sides went well beyond simple trade or the 
exchange of goods and services.  Rather, Taiwan’s businesses set 
up integrated production networks across the Strait in which 
different stages (e.g., design and the manufacture of advanced 
components in Taiwan and final assembly in China) were conducted 
in the ROC and PRC,21creating what Gary Gereffi has called 
“commodity chains.”22
                                                 
21 Barry Naughton, Ed., The China Circle: Economics and Electronics in the 
PRC, Taiwan, and Hong Kong (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1997); Yu-Shan Wu, 
“Economic Reform, Cross-Straits Relations, and the Politics of Issue 
Linkage,” pp. 111-133 in T.J. Cheng, Chi Huang, and Samuel S.G. Wu, Eds., 
Inherited Rivalry: Conflict Across the Taiwan Straits(Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1995). 
 
 
22Gary Gereffi, “More Than the Market, More Than the State: Global Commodity 
Chains and Industrial Upgrading in East Asia,” pp. 38-59 in Steve Chan, Cal 
Clark, and Danny Lam, Eds., Beyond the Developmental State: East Asia's 
Political Economies Reconsidered(New York: MacMillan, 1998). 
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Because of the large amounts of goods sent from Taiwan to 
China for final processing, exports are a key indicator of how 
cross-Strait economic integration is proceeding.  Table 3 shows 
that exports from Taiwan to China jumped sharply during the 
first half of the 1990s and then stabilized during the second 
half of the decade.  A new surge began in 2001, Chen’s second 
year in office.  Overall, the share of Taiwan’s exports going to 
China rose by three-quarters from 17% in 1999 (the year before 
Chen took office) to 30% in 2007 (his last full year in office).  
For Ma’s first three years in office through the first quarter 
of 2011, in contrast, this level remained almost constant at 
about 30%.  The corresponding data on imports in Table 4 show a 
fairly similar pattern.  Goods from China jumped dramatically 
from 4% to 13% of Taiwan’s import mix between 1999 and 2007 but 
then only increased to 14%-15% in 2010-11. 
Tables 3 & 4 about here 
Critics of the ROC’s close economic relations with the PRC 
raise several major concerns.  Taiwan’s businesses will become 
dependent on the Mainland, making them vulnerable to economic 
pressure; import surges from China will destroy important 
economic sectors in Taiwan; Taiwan’s economy will “hollow out” 
as even its most advanced industries migrate across the Strait; 
and the country will lose its sovereignty as China gains 
21 
 
leverage.23 The trade data in Tables 3 and 4 are not necessarily 
inconsistent (or consistent, for that matter) with these 
arguments.  What is totally inconsistent with the data, though, 
is the image that the KMT promotes and the DPP retards these 
economic trends.  The data on investment in Table 5, in 
contrast, are more consistent with the fears that Taiwan’s 
advanced industries are leaving since both total investment and 
the average size of the projects jumped by 40% to 60% between 
2007 and 2010 here.  Both of these substantial increases, 
though, were continuations of trends under the Chen 
administration.  Overall, therefore, this discussion suggests 
two conclusions.  First, cross-Strait trade and investment 
appears to respond primarily to economic, not political, 
factors;24
Table 5 about here 
 and, second, political rhetoric on the issue departs 
substantially from recent economic history.   
  
                                                 
23Peter C.Y. Chow, “The Emerging Trade Bloc Across the Taiwan Strait: The 
Implications of ECFA and Its Aftermath for U.S. Economic and Strategic 
Interests in East Asia,” pp. 255-276 in Cal Clark, Ed., The Changing Dynamics 
of Relations Among China, Taiwan, and the United States(Newcastle upon Tyne, 
UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011). 
 
24Steve Chan, “The Political Economy of Détente: Taiwan’s Economic Integration 
with China,” pp. 68-87 in Seyom Brown, Cal Clark, Hiroki Takeuchi, and 
Alexander Tan, Eds., Taiwan at a Turning Point (Baltimore: Maryland Series in 
Contemporary Asian Studies, School of Law, University of Maryland, 2009); 
Clark and Tan, Taiwan’s Political Economy, Chapter 4. 
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Paradox 4: 
The Ma Rapprochement: Current Stability 
Masking the Threat of Future Instability? 
 
 
 
 
Ma Ying-jeou immediately implemented a much more 
conciliatory policy toward China in order to reduce the Chinese 
threat in general and to promote Taiwan’s economic recovery in 
particular.  Hu Jintao responded quite favorably continuing a 
policy that placed its central emphasis on deterring Taiwan 
Independence rather than pushing for immediate Unification.25  
The result was a rapid de-escalation of tensions in the Strait 
that evidently pleased Washington as well as Beijing and 
Taipei.26
In the period since Ma came to office in Taiwan, the Hu 
administration’s cross-Strait policy has included:  a de 
facto diplomatic truce ...; acceptance of a modest 
expansion of international space for Taiwan (including, 
most notably, “Chinese Taipei’s” participation as an 
observer at the World Health Assembly meetings beginning in 
2009); and ECFA and other cross-Strait economic 
arrangements that have been, in narrow economic terms at 
 
                                                 
25Huang with Li, Inseparable Separation. 
 
26Shelley Rigger, “Accentuating the Positive and Eliminating the Negative in 
Taipei, Washington, and Beijing,”Foreign Policy Research Institutes Notes, 
February 2011, www.fpri.org. 
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least, fairly generous to Taiwan.  Such measures have 
seemingly helped to calm the fear or sense of desperation 
in some quarters in Taiwan that had generated support for 
Chen Shui-bian’s more confrontational and risky policies.  
And they helped to flesh out a scenario in which stability 
and ongoing improvements in cross-Strait relations offer a 
significant upside for Taiwan.27
 
 
The long-term stability of this rapprochement can certainly 
be questioned, however.  The Beijing’s and Taipei’s views about 
Taiwan’s sovereignty remain totally incompatible.  In 
particular, while the PRC has seemingly deferred demands for 
Unification, it has not exhibited any willingness to compromise 
its long-term principles and objectives regarding Unification.  
Consequently, the potential for the eruption a more conflictual 
relationship in the near future remains significant.28
                                                 
27Jacques de Lisle, “Strait Ahead? China’s Fifth Generation Leaders and 
Beijing’s Taiwan Policy,”Foreign Policy Research Institutes Notes, July 2011, 
www.fpri.org. 
  More 
ominously perhaps, fears of and proposals for a decrease in 
America’s security commitment to Taiwan are now appearing, based 
on some combination of China’s increasing economic and military 
leverage, the U.S.’s entanglements elsewhere in the world, ill 
 
28 Elizabeth Hague, “China Debates the Way Forward for Cross-Strait 
Relations,” pp. 155-174 in Cal Clark, Ed., The Changing Dynamics of Relations 
Among China, Taiwan, and the United States (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011); Huang with Li, Inseparable Separation. 
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will toward Taiwan left over from the Chen administration, the 
State Department’s long-standing tilt toward Beijing, and fears 
that Taipei will embrace China.29
This creates the paradox that the current stability in 
cross-Strait relations may well be a harbinger of future 
tensions and instability.  Indeed, the very success of economic 
negotiations over the past few years, regardless of their 
ultimate effects on Taiwan’s economy, may be destabilizing 
because they create pressure and momentum to move on to 
political issues where the positions of the two sides remain 
irreconcilable.  This also produces a paradox in the domestic 
debate in Taiwan over cross-Strait relations.  Clearly, Ma has 
been quite reluctant to engage the PRC on political questions.  
This strongly suggests that he agrees with his DPP critics about 
China’s ultimate intentions about Taiwan and the dangers that 
they create for his country.  Conversely, Ma’s actions (or in 
this case inactions) cast some doubt about the DPP charges that 
the KMT is destroying Taiwan’s sovereignty.     
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29John Copper, “Could US Policy Abandon Taiwan?” Taipei Times, May 11, 2011; 
Charles Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?” Foreign Affairs Vol. 90 
(March/April 2011) pp. 80-91.  
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Figure 1 
CHALLENGE AND COUNTER-CHALLENGE ACROSS THE TAIWANSTRAIT 
 
Date Event 
1995-96 China’s “missile diplomacy” in response to 
Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to 
CornellUniversity 
1999 Lee Teng-hui’s concept of “special state-to-
state relations” 
2000 Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji threatens Taiwan 
voters against electing a pro-Independence 
candidate; after election PRC demands Taiwan 
accept “one China” principle 
2002 President Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan warns that 
Taiwan “will go its own way” and states that 
there is “one country on each side of the 
Strait” 
2003-04 Chen Shui-bian’s presidential campaign appeals 
strongly to Taiwanese nationalism:  holding a 
referendum, plan for a new Constitution, and 
February 28th hand-in-hand rally 
2005 PRC’s Anti-Secession Law 
2006 Chen Shui-bian orders the National Unification 
Council and the National Unification 
Guidelines to “cease to function” 
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Table 1 
 
 ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION OF TAIWAN’S CITIZENS 
 
 
  Taiwanese  Both  Chinese 
 
1992   20%   52%   28% 
1996   24%   56%   20% 
2000   39%   47%   14% 
2004   43%   51%   6% 
2008   51%   45%   4% 
2010   55%   42%   3% 
 
Source:  
Election Study Center, National Cheng Chi University, Mucha, 
Taiwan. Results from Election Surveys. 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 
2008, 2010. 
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Table 2 
 
 PREFERENCE FOR TAIWAN’S INTERNATIONAL STATUS 
 
 
  Independence Status Quo   Unification 
 
 
1994   14%   61%   25% 
1996   17%   56%   27% 
2000   18%   59%   23% 
2004   24%   61%   15% 
2008   26%   63%   11% 
2010   24%   64%   12% 
 
Source:  
Election Study Center, National Cheng Chi University, Mucha, 
Taiwan. Results from Election Surveys. 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 
2008, 2010. 
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Figure 3.8 
 
How Democratization Moderated the National Identity 
and Cross-Strait Relations Issues 
 
 
 
DPP     Trashing at polls       Huge Peng loss in 1996 & 
        in 1991 leads to        Chinese threats convince         
        some moderation         most DPP leaders that 
Independence is impossible 
 
Growing consensus among 
KMT     Lee victory leads to                                     parties & in society on 
        commitment to eventual                                   national identity and 
        unification coupled with                                 cross-Strait relations    
aggressive “pragmatic                                    1. “New Taiwanese”  
    diplomacy”                 Taiwanization of KMT                identity 
                                   reduces Islander              2. Consensus on cross- 
                                   resentment                          Strait relations 
                                                                       at 1996 NDC 
                                                                 3. Candidate moderation 
& similar stances 
New     Pro-Unification after                                          on cross-Strait 
Party   1993 break with KMT                                            relations in 
                                                                       2000 elections 
 
                           Chinese threats during 1995-96 
Taiwan Strait crisis make 
                           supporting Unification untenable 
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Table 3 
 
 TAIWAN’S EXPORTS TO CHINA 
(estimated by the Mainland Affairs Council, ROC) 
 
         VALUE OF EXPORTS     PERCENT OF TAIWAN’S 
            ($US bil)            TOTAL EXPORTS 
 
1984           --                     1%  
1985           --                     3% 
1986           --                     2% 
1987           --                     2% 
1988           --                     4% 
1989           --                     5% 
 
1990          $4.4                    7%  
1991          $7.5                   10% 
1992         $10.5                   13% 
1993         $14.0                   16% 
1994         $16.0                   17% 
1995         $19.4                   17% 
1996         $20.7                   18% 
1997         $22.5                   18% 
1998         $19.8                   18% 
1999         $21.3                   17% 
 
2000         $25.0                   16% 
2001         $25.6                   20% 
2002         $31.5                   23% 
2003         $38.3                   25% 
2004         $48.9                   27%  
2005         $56.3                   28% 
2006         $63.3                   28% 
2007         $74.2                   30% 
2008         $74.0                   29% 
2009         $62.1                   30% 
2010         $84.8    31% 
2011*        $21.9                   30% 
 
*January through March only. 
 
SOURCE:   
Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly, Number 220. Taipei: 
Mainland Affairs Council,www.mac.gov.tw, 2011, pp. 24&26. 
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Table 4 
 
 TAIWAN’S IMPORTS FROM CHINA 
(estimated by the Mainland Affairs Council, ROC) 
 
         VALUE OF IMPORTS     PERCENT OF TAIWAN’S 
            ($US bil)            TOTAL IMPORTS 
 
1985           --                     1% 
1986           --                     1% 
1987           --                     1% 
1988           --                     1% 
1989           --                     1% 
 
1990          $0.71%  
1991          $0.3 1% 
1992         $0.71% 
1993         $1.0                    1% 
1994         $1.9 2% 
1995         $3.13% 
1996         $3.13% 
1997         $3.93% 
1998         $4.14% 
1999         $4.54% 
 
2000         $6.24% 
2001         $5.95% 
2002         $8.07% 
2003         $11.09% 
2004         $16.810%  
2005         $20.111% 
2006         $24.712% 
2007         $28.013% 
2008         $31.413% 
2009         $24.414% 
2010         $36.0  14% 
2011*        $10.315% 
 
*January through March only. 
 
SOURCE:   
Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly, Number 220. Taipei: 
Mainland Affairs Council,www.mac.gov.tw, 2011, pp. 24 &26. 
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Table 5 
 
 TAIWAN INVESTMENT IN CHINA APPROVED BY MOEA 
(approved by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC) 
 
 
             TOTAL AMOUNT         AVERAGE INVESTMENT 
           (in billion US$)        (in million US$) 
 
1991            $0.2                $0.73           
1992            $0.2        $0.94         
1993*           $1.1               $0.90 
1994            $1.0     $1.03 
1995            $1.1               $2.23 
1996            $1.2               $3.21 
1997*           $4.3     $0.50 
1998*           $2.0     $1.58 
1999            $1.3     $2.57 
 
2000            $2.6     $3.10 
2001            $2.8     $2.35 
2002*           $6.7     $2.16 
2003*           $7.7     $1.99 
2004            $6.9     $3.46 
2005            $6.0     $4.63 
2006            $7.6     $7.01 
2007           $10.0        $10.01 
2008           $10.7        $16.63 
2009            $7.1                   $12.11 
2010   $14.6       $15.99 
2011    $3.9       $17.43 
 
*Includes some projects from previous years that were registered 
in that year. 
 
**January through March only. 
 
SOURCES:   
Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly, Number 220. Taipei: 
Mainland Affairs Council,www.mac.gov.tw, 2011, p. 28. 
Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly, Number 141. Taipei: 
Mainland Affairs Council,www.mac.gov.tw, 2004, p. 26. 
 
 
 
 
